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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

ALAN DAVIS, Special Administrator
of the Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard,

CASE NO. 312322
JUDGE SUSTER

Plaintiff,
V.

STATE OF OHIO,

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY
FROM 1954 CORONER'S
INQUEST

Defendant.
Defendant, State of Ohio, hereby moves this Court for an order denying Plaintiff's

-

Motion to Exclude all Testimony from 1954 Coroner's Inquest. Plaintiff's brief fails to address
why all inquest testimony shou'.d be excluded except for the inquest testimony of Dr. Sam
Sheppard. The reasons and authorities for denying plaintiff's motion are set forth in the attached
brief, which is incorporated by reference.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio

.

-

NO J ORADINI, JR. ( 39848)
Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County
The Justice Center, Courts Tower
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT
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BRTEF
I. FACTS

A.

MIS-CIT~D

STATEMENTS BY PLAINTIFF

The Coroner's Inquest into the death of Marilyn Sheppard commenced at 9:00
a.m., July 22, 1954. At the outset, Dr. Samuel R. Gerber stated:
At this time under the authority vested in me by the statutes
of the State of Ohio, I am opening an inquest into the death of
Marilyn Sheppard. For those who are assembled here the School
Board requests that you do not smoke, and as far as other
instructions are concerned I request that the newspaper
photographers wii! take their pictures of the witness at the time that
he or she is seated in the chair; not to take pictures during the
process of testifir.g. I also request that persons do not leave the
room and come back in indiscriminately. I would like to have
complete and orderly decorum. If I do not have complete and
orderly decorum 1 will have that person removed from the room.
(emphasis added)(Tr. 3).

-

Dr. Samuel H. Sheppard was the ninth witness to testify at the inquest. (Tr. 2).
His testimony is found between Tr. 189-3 51. Six witnesses had testified after Dr. Samuel
H. Sheppard, when Coroner, Dr. Gerber made the following statement at 1:00 p.m., July

26, 1954, in its' entirety:

•

-

Let the re.:ord show that the photographers were told that
they could take pictures of the witnesses only at the time they came
into the room, and at the time they were leaving, with flashbulbs,
and that at no time were they to take flashes during the time the
witness was on th~ witness chair, that there was to be no smoking
in this building because of School Board orders, that the people
were to conduct themselves accordingly, that the people were to
conduct themselves accordingly, or else the room would be cleared
of spectators.

2

Let the record further show that no remarks will be
included in the coroner's record other than those made by the
coroner, and the testimony of the witness, and remarks made by
the assistant prosecutor Saul Danaceau; that the entire record will
be of this fashion. "(emphasis added)" (Tr. 475).

Plaintiff's motion lacks credibility from the outset.

Plaintiff miscites Dr. Gerber's

statements and takes his statements out of context. Plaintiff's red-herring citation in footnote
no.2 alleging Dr. Gerber orderej that no remarks from Dr. Samuel Sheppard's attorney be
included in the record based on attorney general opinion 1935 0.A.G. 4837 (attorneys could be
present at inquests, but could not object or participate in any way) defies logic and the clear
meaning of Dr. Gerber's statements.
Clearly, Dr. Gerber's statements show that he was only trying to keep orderly decorum in

-

the hearing room due to the presence of numerous spectators. (Tr. 3, 475).

Moreover, Dr.

Gerber had no reason to keep Dr. Samuel Sheppard's attorneys' remarks from the record where
pursuant to law, they were not participating in the inquest.

B. CORONER'S DUTfES UNDER THE OHIO REVISED CODE

During 1954 and today, the laws of the State of Ohio governing the Coroner are
embodied in the Code between Section 313.01 to 313.99. (Dr. Gerber's testimony, Tr. 3137,
3494).

One of the primary responsibilities of a county coroner has always been to determine the
course, manner, and mode of unexplained deaths in the county. R.C. 313.17; 313.19; 1998 Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 98-031. To make the required determinations, a coroner has always had broad

-
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.,-.

authority to gather information and to hold an inquest. Id.; 313.11; 313.17; 1988 Op. Att'y Gen.
No. 88-035; 1989 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 89-039.
During 1954, RC. 313.11 read: "Any person who discovers the body or acquires the first
knowledge of the death of any person who died as a result of criminal or other violent means

***

or in any suspicious or unusual manner, shall immediately notify the Office of the Coroner of the
known facts concerning the time, place, manner and circumstances of such death and any other
information which is required by Section 313.01 to 313.22, inclusive, of the Revised Code. (Tr.

3494-3495). Thus, Samuel Sheppard, the husband and witness was required under Ohio law to
inform Dr. Gerber of what he witnessed regarding Marilyn's death.
R.C. 313.12, entitled "Notices to coroner of violent, suspicious, unusual or sudden
death," reads the same today as it did in 1954: "when any person dies as a result of criminal or

-

other violent means

***

or i11 any suspicious or unusual manner, the physician called in

attendance shall immediately nci:ify the Office of the Coroner of the known facts concerning the
time, place, manner and circumstances of such death, and any other information which is
required to Sections 313.01 to 313.22, inclusive, of the Revised Code (Tr. 3495). Thus, Samuel
Sheppard, the Doctor, was also required under Ohio law to inform Dr. Gerber of what he
witnessed regarding Marilyn's death.
R.C. 313.17, entitled "Subpoenas, Oath & Testimony of Witnesses" reads the same today
• as it did in 1954. This is the inquest statute. (Tr. 3497). The first sentence reads: "The Coroner
or Deputy Coroner may issue st:bpoenas for such witnesses as are necessary, administer to such
witnesses the usual oath, and proceed to inquire how the deceased came to his death, whether by
violence from any other person or persons, by whom, as principals or accessories before or after

-

the fact, and all circumstances relating thereto." (Tr. 3496). Thus, under Ohio law, Dr. Gerber
4

-

had the authority to conduct the Coroner's Inquest into the death of Marilyn Sheppard. Dr.
Gerber's inquest was only investigatory in nature and not a trial.

Plaintiff's reference to the

Cleveland Press editorial calling for an inquest did not negate Dr. Gerber's authority and duty to
investigate.
Moreover, while statutory procedure is to be followed in conducting an inquest, the
officer conducting the inquest had broad discretion in the manner in which it is conducted. 18
Corpus Juris 228. The inquest is required to be public. Id.; R.C. 313.10.
The record is devoid of any evidence that Dr. Gerber did not follow statutory procedure
during the inquest, namely the inquest was and is required to be public. Further, Dr. Samuel
Sheppard was not the accused during the inquest. Sheppard v. Maxwell(1966), 384 U.S. 333,
339-40. Dr. Samuel was not entitled to additional rights or exceptions in relation to the other

-

witnesses appearing at the inquest.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

A. SHEPPARD _y. MAXWELL, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).

Plaintiff's citation to Sh~QQ.MQ, supra, supports the denial of this motion because the
United States Supreme Court did not state that the Coroner's inquest, which was and is allowed
•

under Ohio law, was improper. Further, although Dr. Samuel Sheppard's chief trial counsel was
ejected for violating Ohio law and the orderly decorum of the inquest by attempting to place
documents in the coroner's record, Dr. Samuel Sheppard had additional counsel present. Id.,
339-40. Moreover, it appears that the ejection of Dr, Samuel Sheppard's chief trial counsel did

-

not occur during Dr. Samuel Sheppard's testimony. Id.
5

.....

B. INTRODUCTION OF INQUEST TESTIMONY OF
DR. SAMUEL SHEPPARD DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS.

The coroner's duty is to determine the cause of death when he has acquired jurisdiction.
His jurisdiction arises when an h1ividual dies as a result of "criminal or other violent means , or
by casualty, suspicious or unusual manner." R.C. 313.12; 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 73-123.
The purpose of an inquest was considered in 1935 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 4837.

That

opinion states, at p. 1400, as follows:
The purpose of an inquest is not merely to determine the cause of
the death of the deceased party, but also to aid in detecting crime
and causing the punishment of the parties guilty thereof * * * . An
inquest held by a Coroner is an ex parte proceeding intended by the
legislature to be merelv an investigation to determine the cause of
death of a deceased party, * * * (emphasis added)."

-

The Opinion further proYides that the coroner has no power to hold or detain a person in
custody. 1969 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 69-036, held that a coroner cannot apply the law to facts and
determine violations of statutes and responsibility of individuals. Thus, it is clear that the role of
the coroner in the criminal process is purely an investigatory one, and that he has no power to
make legal judgments.
Miranda warnings have been developed as a result of interplay between the Fifth and

•

Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The Fifth Amendment states that no one must be a
witness against himself, and the Sixth guarantees the right to counsel. Both of these amendments
have been held to afford protec'.ion against involuntary confessions or incriminatory statements
where a person is in the custody of, and being interrogated by, the police. In Miranda, the Court

....

defined "custodial interrogation" as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
6

-

person has been taken into ,custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action m any
significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
In considering informal questioning and the appearance of witnesses at an inquest, it must
be recalled that the coroner does not have the power to take anyone into custody and his criminal
role is purely investigatory. Consequently, the coroner would not be required to give Miranda
warnings, except in questioning a person already under police custody. The fact that the witness
appears in response to a subpoena or a summons does not mean that the interrogation is
custodial. United States v. Maius, 378 F.2d 716 (CA6), cert. den. 389, U.S. 905; 1975 Op. Att'y
Gen. No. 75-011.
Plaintiff miscites State v. Carder (1966), 9 Ohio St. 2d 1, which actually held that the
Escobedo and Miranda decisior.s concerning in-custody interrogation apply only to trials begun

-

after dates of those decisions, 1964 and 1966, respectively and are not retroactive. Id., at 5.
Moreover, Carder, primarily addressed the holding of Escobedo v. State of Illinois (1964) 3 78
U.S. 478 which held "statements elicited by police during an in custody interrogation may not be
used against the accused at a criminal trial, where the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect ... (emphasis added)."
Admissions voluntarily r.1ade by an accused at a coroner's inquest may be used against
him. State v. Sharp (1954) 162 Ohio St. 173 citing Church v. State 179 Miss. 440; State v.

~

• 106 S.C. 289; State v. McClurg 50 Idaho 762. (By the great weight of authority, ifthe testimony
is voluntarily given at the Coroner's inquest, admissions of defendant, afterward charged with
murder made as a witness at said inquest are admissible (citations omitted) .

......
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1. INQUEST TESTIMONY \VAS VOLUNTARY STRATEGY

Dr. Samuel Sheppard was an extremely intelligent man.
account regarding waiver of rights and privileges.

Education can be taken into

State v. Mayabb (1958) 316 S.W. 2d 609;

State v. Davidson(l 990) 558 N.E. 2d 1077; State v. Nicholi (1969) 451 P. 2d 351. Moreover,
Dr. Samuel Sheppard had the assistance of more than one intelligent attorney prior to his inquest
testimony. These attorneys wern present throughout the entire inquest. Sheppard, supra, at 33940.

It would be absurd to think that Dr. Samuel Sheppard and his attorneys did not discuss

whether he would testify at the inquest, and what he would testify to at the inquest. If such
discussions did not occur, the attorneys would have been ineffective and Dr. Samuel Sheppard
would have had no need for their representation.

Obviously, counsel advised Dr. Samuel

Sheppard to cooperate with the inquest as a matter of strategy. Based on this advice, Dr. Sam
Sheppard chose not to exercise hi,; personal privilege of not testifying against himself.
The fact, standing alone, that Dr. Samuel Sheppard was subpoenaed to the coroner's
inquest did not make his testimony before the coroner involuntary.

Mayabb, supra; State v.

McDaniel 80 S.W. 2d 185. He was not under arrest or in custody or under any type of restraint.
Nicholi, supra. He was not coerced into giving his testimony. Mayabb, supra. Plaintiff can not
credibly argue that Dr. Samuel Sheppard's inquest testimony was not voluntarily given pursuant
to counsel's advice.
Where one is called and sworn as a witness at a coroner's
inquest, not then being under arrest, nor accused of crime and
testifies as such witness, under oath, his so given statements are
regarded as voluntary and may be given in evidence against him on
a trial for the murder of the deceased over whose body the inquest
is held, even where he was not cautioned as to his rights before

-

8

g1vmg his testimony at
(1931)( citations omitted).

the

inquest.

State v.

McClurg

50 Idaho 762.
Likewise, plaintiff's sole argument that Dr. Samuel Sheppard's inquest testimony was not
voluntary because he was subpoenaed to the inquest lacks merit.

Clearly, Dr. Samuel

Sheppard's testimony, given at the coroner's inquest to which he had been subpoenaed at a time
he was not under arrest is admissible.

C. INTRODUCTION OF INQUEST TESTIMONY OF
DR. SAMUEL SHEPPARD WOULD NOT VIOLATE
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

The following cases and only cases herein, cited by plaintiff are inapplicable to this
motion.

-

State v. Newberry (1991), 77 Ohio App. 3d 818 (defendants were not entitled to a

hearing upon the rejection of their applications to participate in diversion program); Washington
v. Glucksberg (1997), 521 U.S. 702 (asserted right to assistance in committing suicide not
protected by due process clause); Gutzwiller v. Fenik (C.A. 6, 1988), 860 F.2d 1317 (denial of
university professor's tenure did not violate due process); Palko v. State of Connecticut {1937)

302 U.S. 319 (a statute permitting criminal appeals by the state was challenged under the due
process clause).
The following authorities cited by plaintiff in his previous argument, actually show that
• Dr. Samuel Sheppard's due procc~s rights were not violated at the inquest. 1935 Op. Att'y Gen.

4837 stated:

-

An inquest held by a Coroner is an ex parte proceeding intended
by the legislature to be merely an investigation to determine the
cause of death of a deceased party, and although the finding of the
Coroner may be the basis for criminal prosecution, nevertheless

9

-

such a hearing is not a trial within the meaning of Section 1O of
Article 1 of the Constitution of Ohio, which provides in part:
* * In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall
be allowed to appear and defend in person and with
counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof;
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to procure the attendance of
witnesses ;n his behalf, and a speedy trial by an
impartial jury of the county in which the offense is
alleged to !tave been committed; * * * ."

Likewise, In re Graban (1955) 164 Ohio St. 26 which involved a state fire marshal's
investigation pursuant to R. C. 3 73 7 .13 stated:

-

The remaining contention of the appellant is that, if the statute
authorizes the exclusion of counsel, it is violative of the provisions
of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States and of the provisions of Section
10 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio, the latter of which read
in part as follows:
'In any trial, in any court, the party accused shall be allowed to
appear and defenC. in person and with counsel * * *. No person
shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against
himself* * *.'
As observed by the lower courts, there are several reasons why
these provisions 2.re inapplicable to the instant investigation. There
is no 'trial' or 'cr;minal case' pending; there is no 'accused party';
this matter is not pending in 'any court' self-incrimination is not
involved, inasmuch as the Fire Marshal agrees that the appellants
can not be compelled to testify against themselves; the privilege is
personal; * * * .
Hence, it is apparent that the constitutional rights of the
appellants have not been violated and that the lower courts were
correct in denying the relief sought.

-

10

-

Dr. Gerber's inquest was only an investigation.

There was no trial or criminal case

pending against Dr. Samuel Sheppard. Likewise, there was no accused party; the right against
self-incrimination was not invoh·ed at the inquest because the matter was not pending in any
court. Dr. Samuel Sheppard cho~e not to exercise his personal privilege of not testifying against
himself. (See supra).

D. OTHER JURISDICTIONS PERMIT INQUEST TESTIMONY.

In a prosecution for murder, evidence given by defendant at the coroner's inquest was
admissible. State v. Shiefel ( 1923) 180 Wis. 186. At a murder trial, the judge did not abuse his
discretion in admitting the entire prior testimony of the defendant at an inquest hearing simply
because the inquest procedure d:d not permit cross-examination of a witness. Commonwealth v.

-

Russell G. Labbe (1977), 6 Mas.s. App. Ct. 73, Defendant's testimony at coroner's inquest held
voluntary and admissible at defendant's trial.

State v. Anding (1987) Mo. App. LEXIS 4651;

State v. Mayabb (Mo. S. Ct. 1958) 316 S.W. 3d 609; State v. McDaniel (Mo. S. Ct. 1935) 80
S.W. 2d 185. See, also, State v. Murdock (Ill. S. Ct. 1968) 39 Ill. 2d 553; State v. Nicholi (Alas.
S. Ct. 1969) 451P.2d351; State v. McCarbrey (Kan. S. Ct. 1940) 152 Kan. 18.

E. CORONER RECORDS ARE ADMISSABLE
AS PUBLIC RECORDS.

R.C. 313.10 provides: "The records of the coroner, made by himself or by anyone acting
under his direction or supervision are public records, and such records, or transcripts

* * * shall

be received as evidence or any criminal or civil court in this state, as the facts contained in such
records (emphasis added)."

-

11

,-

Coroner records are um:uestionably public records. R.C. 313.09 and 313.10; State, ex
rel. v. Schroeder ( 1996) 76 Ohio St. 3d 580; State. ex rel. v. Dayton Newspaper Inc. v. Roach
(1984), 12 Ohio St. 3d 100. Coroner records are public records and shall be received as evidence
in any criminal or civil court.

State v. Mack (Dec. 2, 1993) Cuyahoga App. No. 62366,

unreported; Carson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1951), 156 Ohio St. 104.

F. INQUEST TF;:STTMONY IS OTHERWISE ADMISSABLE

Defendant cites the following cases in support of its previous arguments. State v. Van
Tassel (1897) 103 Iowa 6 (where defendant appeared voluntarily, and gave his evidence, at an
inquest held on the body of his wife, such evidence was admissible on his trial for her murder,
for the purpose of impeaching him, and as substantive evidence).

·-

State v. Hurley (1889), 46

Ohio St. 320 (state is permitted to interrogate its witness in respect to his testimony at the
coroner's inquest which are inconsistent with his trial testimony).
State. ex rel. v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners ( 1988) 145 Wis. 2d 504 (prior
videotaped inquest testimony was not hearsay and may be used against declarant.

It goes

without saying that a defendant r.1 a criminal trial may not be called adversely. Nevertheless, the
defendant's prior statements cc.r. be used against him).

Furthermore, Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(a)

provides a statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered against a party and is his own
• statement, in either his individual or representative capacity. Evid.R. 804(A)(4) provides for a
hearsay exception where the witness is unable to testify because of death.

Accordingly, Dr.

Sheppard's inquest testimony is admissible under Ohio Evid. Rule.

-

12

,,.... CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio

-

~ERTIFICATE

OF SERVICE

A copy of the foregoing Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude
Testimony from 1954 Coroner's Inquest was hand delivered to Terry Gilbert and George Carr,
attorneys for plaintiff, this

7YJ

day of February, 2000 .
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